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SECURITIES REGULATION

Securities Regulation-Deception and the "in connection with" Clause
of Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule lObare designed to prevent fraud and deceit "in connection with the
purchase and sale of any security." ' 3 In Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,' the Supreme Court reiterated a liberal
construction of rule lOb-5 and issued rare policy guidance' as to who
must be deceived, what transactions are "in connection with" a sale of
securities, and who has standing to bring a rule l0b-5 cause of action.
The New York State Superintendent of Insurance, as liquidator of
Manhattan Casualty Co. (Manhattan), brought an action for damages
to Manhattan alleged to have resulted from a fraudulent scheme "in
connection with" a sale of United States Treasury bonds owned by it.
Bankers Life, the sole stockholder of Manhattan, sold all its stock to
James F. Begole for five million dollars. A conspiracy of Begole and
Standish T. Bourne, and possibly others, arranged for a check for five
million dollars to be issued by the Irving Trust Company for the purchase price. Because the conspirators had no funds on deposit with
Irving Trust, as soon as the sale of the Manhattan stock was consumated Manhattan's entire investment portfolio consisting of Treasury
bonds was transferred to Irving Trust to cover the five-million-dollar
check.' In order to disguise the fraud, the conspirators initiated a second
series of transactions that resulted in superficially valid corporate books
but an actual loss to Manhattan of five million dollars. The net effect
52

'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The relevant portion
of § 10(b) is set out in Note, Securities Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule
lOb-5, 50 N.C.L. REv. 706, 707 n. I (1972).
217 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971). For the text of rule lOb-5 see Note, 50 N.C.L. REv., supra
note 1,at 707 n. 2.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b),, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-

5(1971).
192 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
sDespite the fact that § 10(b) and rule l0b-5 "may well be the most frequently litigated
provisions in the federal securities laws," SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969),
Bankers Life is only the second United States Supreme Court interpretation of them. The first
was SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
192 S. Ct. at 167.
7
Certificates of deposit were obtained in Manhattan's name in the second series of transactions. However, "the certificates of deposit were never assets of Manhattan" because they had been
pledged upon creation as collateral for a $5,000,000 loan in favor of an unrelated corporation.
People v. Sweeny, 27 N.Y.2d 138, 148, 261 N.E.2d 655, 659-60, 313 N.Y.S.2d 744, 750-51 (1970)
(a criminal trial resulting from these transactions). As a result Manhattan's corporate books
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of these transactions was that Begole and his fellow conspirators obtained control of Manhattan by misappropriating Manhattan's own
assets to buy all of its outstanding stock.8
It was understood that a general state tort law cause of action
existed against the conspirators for the fraudulent transactions which
resulted in the depletion of Manhattan's assets without a corresponding
benefit. However, the issue litigated in Bankers Life was whether a
federal cause of action existed under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.9 The
district court, in dismissing the complaint in Bankers Life, concluded
that "the purity of the security transaction and the purity of the trading
process are the sole objectives"' 0 of lOb-5 jurisdiction. The court of
appeals, affirming, enunciated the congressional purpose as "limited to
preserving the integrity of the securities markets."" However, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that these interpretations of lOb-5 were too narrow and that "[s]ection 10(b) must be read
flexibly, not technically and restrictively."'" All three courts based their
decisions to some extent on the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and yet they reached obviously different results-possibly because there is a dearth3 of evidence as to the congressional intent in
enacting section 10(b).1
The Supreme Court in Bankers Life did not directly address the
unsettled issue of whether the plaintiff in a lOb-5 cause of action must
reflected only the sale of its Treasury bonds and the purchase of a certificate of deposit for a like
amount. They did not reflect the misappropriation. 92 S. Ct. at 167.
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970). A federal
cause of action is generally sought by the plaintiff because state substantive law may be more
restrictive and state procedural rules may create obstacles to the plaintiff's recovery. See generally
Comment, The Prospectsfor Rule X-IOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59
YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-36 (1950).
"0300 F. Supp. at 1101.
"1430 F.2d at 361.
292 S.Ct. at 169. This is a reaffirmance of the Court's holding in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), that securities legislation "'enacted for the
purpose of avoiding frauds,' [should be construed] not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to

effectuate its remedial purposes." (Footnote omitted.) Since Congress could not catalog all the

kinds of fraudulent and illegitimate schemes, it gave broad discretionary powers to the Securities
Commission. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934). See also Rekant v. Desser,
425 F.2d 872, 880 n.15 (5th Cir. 1970).
'32A BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 2.2(331) (Supp. 1970-71).

The purpose of § 10(b) is to serve as a "catch-all" provision and assure fair dealings in securities
transactions. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
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be a purchaser or seller of securities. The purchaser-or-seller requirement was initially expressed in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 4 but
subsequent decisions have left its validity uncertain. 5 Instead of settling
this controversy, the Supreme Court chose to base its reversal on the
only transaction in which Manhattan was clearly a seller of securities."6
However, an analysis of the facts indicates at least a practical expansion
of the concept of purchasers or sellers. The Superintendent of Insurance,
the liquidator of Manhattan, 7 was allowed to maintain the action. Be-

cause Manhattan was bankrupt the Superintendent was not protecting
the interests of Manhattan but was actually representing the interests

of Manhattan's creditors and policyholders.
Creditors and policyholders are not members of the corporate
decision-making process and have no proprietary interest in the corpo-

ration's assets. 8 However, the Bankers Life Court gave creditors the
power to represent the corporation in a 1Ob-5 action because the legisla-

tive history of section 10(b) indicates congressional concern for the
impact fraudulent transactions have on creditors and because the offi-

cers, directors, and controlling shareholders are under a fiduciary obligation to protect creditors as well as stockholders. 9

The unusual facts of Bankers Life created further problems that the
1193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
"5At least one court has concluded that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in A.T. Brod &
Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), "seriously challenged, if not overruled" the Birnbaum
doctrine. Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The district court in the
principal case, however, applied the doctrine based on the Second Circuit's post-Brod reaffirmance
of the doctrine in Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Birnbaum doctrine has precipitated
commentaries both pro and con. Compare Patton, The "Purchase or Sale" Restriction of SEC
Rule lOb-5-Judicial Extension of a Federal Remedy, 18 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 463 (1969), with
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV.
268 (1968).
"The Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of the SEC as amicus curiae that Bankers Life
could maintain a lOb-5 cause of action based on the sale of the Treasury bonds and that a decision
based on that transaction would afford all the necessary relief. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at
7 n.6. The SEC's reluctance to press its pronounced disagreement with the Birnbaum doctrine is
attributable to its belief that even if the purchaser-or-seller limitation were rejected in Bankers Life,
the other two transactions might have precluded the plaintiff's recovery. Brief for SEC as Amicus
Curiae for Certiorari at 5.
"T he New York Superintendent of Insurance is vested with all the rights of action that the
insurer possessed. N.Y. INs. LAW § 514(2) (McKinney 1966).
11300 F. Supp. at 1101 n.16.
192 S. Ct. at 169.
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Court dismissed with little discussion. Whether deceit"0 was practiced
upon Manhattan was decided by the Court in four words, "the
seller[corporation] was duped .... "121 However, the question of
whether a corporation can be "duped" when all the persons involved in
its decision-making process are involved in the fraudulent scheme had
22
given the district court considerably more difficulty.
The Supreme Court justified its conclusion that Manhattan, as a
seller of securities, was deceived by quoting from a Fifth Circuit case
to the effect that when a person dealing with a corporation denies its
directors access to material information, a lOb-5 action is recognized
23
because the board is disabled from making an informed judgment.
The Supreme Court's decision that Manhattan's directors had been
denied access to material information was based on the court of appeals'
finding that the board had been deceived. 24 However, the Supreme
Court's conclusion contradicts the district court's factual determination
that the injury was not incurred by anyone who was the subject of
federal concern because it was not practiced on the officers, directors,
or shareholders of the corporation. 5
When deception is committed by the directors 2 or the sharehold27
ers, "the corporation is . . . 'deceived,' in the only sense in which a
fictional legal person can be deceived, i.e., through deception practiced
upon those real persons through whom it acts." 8 Moreover, courts have
"Previous Second Circuit decisions have held deception an essential element of a lob-5 cause

of action. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
2192 S. Ct. at 167.

2"[I]t is dubious whether plaintiff corporation was ever defrauded or deceived." 300 F. Supp.
at 1101 n.16.

2Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970).
2
1"No doubt the deception was successful, for had the board known that [those in control of
Manhattan] intended to misappropriate the proceeds for their own use it undoubtedly would not
have authorized their sale." 430 F.2d at 360.
21300 F. Supp. at 1101 n.16.
28
Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). The allegation in Ruckle was that a
majority of the board fraudulently obtained the board's approval of an issue of securities by
withholding a financial statement.
2Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"Id. at 529 (footnote omitted). "All information reasonably relevant to a rational investment
must be disclosed to the decision-making body, whether that body be composed of directors,
officers, or shareholders of the corporation." Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp.

297, 299 (D. Conn. 1966). The issue of deception has met with diverse interpretations. See, e.g.,
O'Neill v. Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff d, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (allegations of deception required); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967) (failure
to disclose material facts to disinterested minority directors constitutes deception); Weitzen v.
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allowed lOb-5 actions for failure to disclose information to a minority
of the directors even though the knowing directors have sufficient votes
to perpetrate the scheme, presumably because the "corporation" was
deceived. 2 However, the vitality of the deception requirement is suspect
if courts recognize deception of the corporation by treating the "corporation" separately from its directors and shareholders.",
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took a more practical ap3
proach to this conceptual problem in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.
There the panel acknowledged the general rule that a corporation can
be deceived only if its agents are deceived, since a corporation can act
only through its agents and can know only what its agents know. 3 2 The
Schoenbaum panel recognized that a corporation may be defrauded
even if all the directors know the material facts, if the transmission of
information to the corporation is .prevented by a conflict between the
interests of the directors and those of the corporation. 3 In other
words, the Schoenbaum panel utilized fictional attributes of a corporation in order to analyze a specific transaction, but Judge Hays, who later
authored the en banc reversal of the panel decision, dissented and was
quick to point out that the corporate fictionalization could "constitute
a trap for the unwary when they ascribe reality to the fictions. ' 34 The
treatment of a corporation as possessing the attributes of a person
cannot be used as a universal solvent for corporate problems. The anKearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (failure to disclose material facts to all stockholders
constitutes deception); Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., supra (no deception unless majority of the decision-making body is misled).
2'Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). Nondisclosure is said to injure the
corporation for several reasons: (1) failure to disclose may preclude others from seeking derivative
relief, Barnett v.Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 776 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dictum); (2) nondisclosure may encourage mismanagement that the knowing director would not otherwise have had the
courage to commit, Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378.(S.D.N.Y. 1967); (3) nondisclosure
may permit the defendants to put themselves in positions to commit further mismanagement, Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
NOne writer, criticizing the finding of deception by treating shareholders as standing in the
place of the corporation, characterized it as "legal slight-of-hand." Comment, Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive Whom?, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 477, 492 (1968).

3'405 F.2d 200, rev'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
32
1d. at 211. See also Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir. 1970); 3 W. FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 790 (perm. ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 9(3),
282(l) (1958).
-405 F.2d at 211.
"Id. at 215 (Hays, J., dissenting). Judge Hays warned against the conclusion that the directors are the corporation and that therefore the corporation has knowledge if the directors have
knowledge. Id.
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thropomorphism must yield to the predominant concern of effectuating
the remedial purposes of lOb-5, 15 and the corporate fiction should not
be interposed between the directors and the injured shareholders. It
must be "the shareholders, the real owners of the property""0 whom the
directors deceive before there is "deceit" in the lOb-5 sense. Unless the
creditors and policyholders of Manhattan are considered to be "the real
owners" of the corporation, the analysis of deceit in Schoenbaum is not
applicable to the Bankers Life situation. This is true because in Bankers
Life all directors and shareholders were aware of the facts.37 "When it
is practical as well as just to do so, courts have experienced no difficulty
in rejecting such cliches as the directors constitute the corporation and
a corporation, like any other person, cannot defraud itself."3 The
Bankers Life Court extended this analysis one step further by allowing
a 1Ob-5 action to be brought to protect creditors from fraud perpetrated
by all the officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporation. Just
as the Schoenbaum Court solved the corporate fiction problem by substituting shareholders for the corporation in order to protect the shareholders, the Bankers Life Court substituted creditors for the corporation
to allow a lOb-5 action for the protection of creditors.
Bankers Life indicated that Congress in enacting the 1934 Act was
concerned with the protection of corporate creditors. The controlling
stockholder owes his corporation a fiduciary obligation to protect
creditors as well as stockholders, and consequently all transactions between the stockholders and the corporation that may injuriously affect
the rights of creditors will be carefully examined. 9 Presumably, this
creditor-protection cause of action will be available in the future only
in fact situations in which the interests of the defrauders are adverse to
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
34405 F.2d at 215 (Hays, J., dissenting).
71n Field v. Lew, 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), affd. 296 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.

denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962), the court held that a corporation could not be injured as a seller when
the sole shareholder authorized a fraudulent misapproproation by corporate insiders. The unau-

thorized acts of the conspirators become the authorized acts of the corporation upon shareholder
ratification. The Bankers Life court rejected this reasoning in order to protect creditors of the

corporation.
'Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964). One court phrased the issue as

whether "the corporation's choice of action . . . [was] made as a reasonable man would make it
if possessed of all the material information .... " Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir.
1970). The imputed knowledge rationale is not followed, presumably because its logical conclusion

would mean the corporation could never be deceived by its directors since their knowledge would
automatically be imputed to the corporation.
1192 S. Ct. at 169.
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the corporation, a requirement which would limit the extent of such
actions.40
In Bankers Life the Supreme Court broadened the scope of transactions that are considered to be "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." The defendants in Bankers Life did not fraudulently induce an unfair purchase price or fail to pay a fair price for the
stock they purchased. 4 They transacted a sale and paid-for the securities
with a check cashed later by Manhattan for the full and fair value.
However, the proceeds of the sale were misappropriated to cover the
check used by Begole and others to purchase the Manhattan stock. The
"inconnection with" language of 1Ob-5 could be construed to include a
fraudulent scheme entailing a promise that value will be received for a
sale of securities and a subsequent misappropriation. However, the
lower courts held that such a construction was unwarranted in this case.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, felt that a lOb-5 action was
justified under a liberal construction of section lOb-5. 2 As one commentator has concluded, the "in connection with" clause "is plainly
and-one must assume-intentionally the loosest linkage, in any of the
federal antifraud provisions, between a proscribed act and a security
transaction. 43 The Bankers Life Court pointed out that Congress did
not intend to regulate transactions amounting to no more than internal
corporate mismanagement," but the Court concluded that the misappropriation of funds was sufficiently "in connection with" the transaction to warrant proscription. The importance of this conclusion is overshadowed by the approach taken to determine the standards to be applied to the "in connection with" clause. Although the Supreme Court
summarily declared that the fraud was used "in connection with" the
transaction, a comparison of its decision with that of the lower courts
"See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
4The court of appeals based its denial of a 10b-5 cause of action on the fact that the misrepresentation did not involve the value of securities. 430 F.2d at 360-61. Although this was not a

widespread interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970); Allico Nat'I

Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, 397 F.2d 727 (7th
Cir. 1968), the Supreme Court's reversal made it clear that such a test is too narrow. In fact, the
court of appeals decision in Bankers Life conflicts with its earlier decision that "[n]either § 10(b)

nor Rule 10b-5 contains any language which would indicate that those provisions were intended
to deal only with fraud as to the 'investment value' of securities, and, indeed, it is established that
a lOb-5 action will survive even though the fraudulent scheme or device is unrelated to 'investment
value.'" A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967).
"See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
431 A BROMBERG, supra note 13, § 7.6(1), at 190.21 (Supp. 1969-1).
"92 S. Ct. at 169.
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will shed insight on the Court's analysis. The Court was satisfied that
"Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities .

. . ."I

The lower courts' requirements

that the purchase or sale of securities be at the crux of a fraudulent
scheme" or be the "sole object" of the fraud47 were rejected. Instead,
the Court emphasized the fact that lOb-5 encompasses schemes that
involve fraud even if the fraud is not of a type " 'usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities.' "48
The district court would not allow lOb-5 actions based on transactions that were mere steps toward accomplishing the ultimate goal of
looting Manhattan's assets." In contrast, several courts had previously
held that misappropriation of the funds from a securities transaction
was sufficient for a lOb-5 cause of action.'" The theory of those cases
was that violators of lOb-5 should not be immunized from liability
merely because their violation is part of a broader scheme of misappropriation, even if corporate looting is the object or result of the fraud.5'
A 1Ob-5 action has been upheld as long as the "purchase or sale" is the
subject or the purpose of the scheme.52 The court of appeals in Bankers
Life erred in separating the transaction into a securities sale and a
subsequent misappropriation 3 because the entire series of events was
one unified scheme with the sale of securities an indispensable part.'
45

Id. (emphasis added). The Court rejected defendant's contention that lob-5 liability would

result in federal preemption of state law governing corporate mismanagement.
11300 F. Supp. at 1101.
17430 F.2d at 360.
1192 S. Ct. at 168 n.7, quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1967).
"The district court said that "Rule lob-5 requires the employment of fraud in connection with

a security transaction, which is essentially different from the effectuation of a security transaction
in connection with a fraudulent activity." 300 F. Supp. at 1102. The sale of Treasury bonds was

for the purpose of effecting the object of the conspiracy (looting Manhattan's assets), but a sale
not independently unlawful (lack of fraud) is not actionable under lOb-5. Id.
"0E.g., Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, 397 F.2d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 1968); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
"Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
' 2Herprich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1970).

"430 F.2d at 360. However, because both series of transactions (sale of securities and coverup) were accomplished in a single day, it would have been more logical to conclude that the sale

transaction was at least an integral part of the scheme than to attempt to separate the sale from
the misappropriation.
51A similar analysis appeared in Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher

Workmen of North America, 397 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1968), in which the court sustained a lob-5
cause of action. Defendant breached a contract to sell stock to plaintiff when a better deal was

offered by a third party. In the process defendant misappropriated 25,000 shares of plaintiff's
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The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the "in connection
with" clause must be read in view of the unusual facts of the Bankers
Life case. The defendants had manipulated a highly complex series of
transactions to gain control of a corporation without expending any of
their own funds. The Court characterized the crux of the Bankers Life
case as being the injury suffered as a result of deceptive practices
"touching" its sale of securities. Thus characterized, the case may not
seem to support a conclusion that the requirements of the "in connec' 55
tion with" clause were liberalized. It could also be said that "but for
the securities transactions there would have been neither an injury nor
a workable scheme. The Court, based on the strong facts presented,
could have concluded that the fraudulent misappropriation was the
proximate cause or, at least, at the crux of the securities transaction or
could merely have differed from the lower courts' assessment of the
facts to hold that the misappropriation was not separable from the
securities transaction. 5 The fact that the Court re-evaluated the
"connection" necessary for 10b-5 and held that fraud "touching" the
transaction is sufficient indicates the liberality of the Court's interpretation of IOb-5 and the increased scope of its use in the future.
To support a IOb-5 action, there need only be a purchase or sale
of securities and fraud that "touches" any part of the transaction. Although the limits of this "touching" have not been defined, clearly a
misappropriation of the corporation's assets to pay the purchase price
of its stock is sufficient. The nature of the fraud, the fact that the only
interests to be protected are those of creditors, and the participation in
the fraud of all the corporate decision makers are irrelevant. By treating
the transaction as a unified whole and not separable parts, the Court
stock, which defendant had held in escrow pending consumation of the deal. The court held that

lOb-5 jurisdiction existed because defendant's motivation included the misappropriation.
"In Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a court denied lOb-5 jurisdiction

despite allegations that defendants purchased the controlling stock by deception and committed
corporate waste. The court held that the deceptive acquisition of control was not the proximate
cause of the later mismanagement. See also Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.

1967).
5This interpretation was not without precedent in the lower courts. In Cooper v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court stated the issue to be whether lob-5
covers a case in which the security purchase "is a vital aspect of a continuing scheme [when]
plaintiff received his full value for the stock purchased but ultimately retained nothing as a result
of the fraudulent arrangement." Answering affirmatively, the court concluded that lob-5 is not

limited to the portion of the transaction involving the exchange of consideration. Id.
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protected a corporation's right to retain something of value from a sale
of securities.57
JOHN D. LOWERY

Truth In Lending-In Support of the Validity of the Regulation Z Four
Installment Rule
In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,' the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt a blow to consumer protection by
holding invalid the four installment rule of Regulation Z, 2 a regulation
promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

pursuant to Title I (Truth in Lending) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Under Regulation Z the disclosure requirements4 of Truth

in Lending are made applicable to "consumer credit," defined in the
regulation as "credit offered or extended. . . for which either a finance
charge is or may be imposed or which pursuant to an agreement, is or
may be payable in more than four installments."5 The court of appeals
held that promulgation of the so-called "four installment rule" was

beyond-the authority granted the Board of Governors by Congress and
that the rule created a conclusive presumption in violation of the due
7
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similarly practical approach to the scope of lOb-5 liability in
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.. 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961): "Considering the purpose of lOb-5, it would be unrealistic to say that a corporation
having the capacity to acquire $700,000 worth of assets for its 700,000 shares of stock has suffered
no loss if what it gave up was $700,000 but what it got was zero."

1449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,92 S. Ct. 1248 (1972). Two student writers have
noted this decision. Note, Consumer Protection-Credit-Administrative Law-Constitutional
Law-Federal Reserve Board Regulation Requiring Disclosure of Credit Terms Any Time Consumer TransactionInvolves Four or More Installments Exceeds Authority Granted the Board by
Truth In Lending Act and Violates Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 876 (1971), strongly criticizes the decision and Note, The Four-InstallmentRule of Regulation Z Exceeds the Scope of Authority Granted by the Truth In Lending Act and Creates an
Irrebuttable Presumption Prohibitedby the Fifth Amendment, 9 Hous. L. REv. 552 (1972),
generally supports it.
212 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1971).
315 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
'Truth in Lending Act §§ 127-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-38 (1970). Under the Act's disclosure
provisions, full disclosure of credit terms must be made to the consumer prior to the consummation
of the credit transaction. The Act requires disclosure both where open-ended credit is involved (e.g.,
credit cards and revolving credit plans) and where credit other than open-ended credit is involved.
-12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1971) (emphasis added).

